DEAR READER,

Apparently, the bots have been quieter on social media lately. After Ukrainian drones hit three Yandex data centres between 8 and 11 October, Cloudflare data showed bot traffic from Yandex’s network collapsing. The analysts, however, note that the chart tracks Yandex’s own web crawlers, not bots. Still, an interesting correlation.

The heavier news is that the US has suspended sanctions on Russian diesel, in the same weekend that Donald Trump said it was time for Ukraine to get a new president. It felt like the right moment to ask what sanctions actually achieve, so this week’s expert opinion by Ana Pisarenco looks at how unevenly they have worked on Russia’s oil trade. We nearly gave the whole weekend its own expert opinion, but events are still moving, so we’ll keep watching.

Moreover: a friend of our newsletter, David Smith, joined Adam Reichardt on Talk Eastern Europe last week to discuss Moldova’s race to join the EU. Click the banner below to watch, and subscribe to David’s newsletter, Moldova Matters, here.

Finally, our weekly opportunities section returns next week, so keep an eye out for it. In the meantime, if you know someone looking for opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe, refer them to this newsletter so they’re in the loop too.

Enjoy reading this week’s “brief”!

— Giorgi Beroshvili, Editor

Crude oil volumes carried by a group of US-sanctioned tankers fell 74 per cent in the first 180-day observation period after designation, excluding wind-down periods allowed for existing operations to be concluded. For a separate group sanctioned by the European Union, the decline was 26 per cent, according to The Impact of Shadow Tanker Designations, a May 2026 study by KSE Institute at the Kyiv School of Economics.

In a later 180-day observation period, crude volumes carried by the US-designated group recovered to 40 per cent below their pre-sanctions level. The EU group’s decline deepened to 50 per cent. American designations caused a sharper initial fall, while the European group saw a larger reduction over time.

The figures show what sanctions did to particular ships. Their effect on Russia’s oil income also depends on whether cargo moves to other vessels, what buyers pay and how much delivery costs.

Robin S. Brooks, a former special adviser to US vice-president Kamala Harris for Europe, Eurasia, multilateral affairs and democracy, argues that the EU has continued a strategy adopted after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. She describes the Trump administration’s approach as more selective and transactional.

Brooks attributes Washington’s faster initial response to preparations before the full-scale invasion. The United States had drawn up sanctions plans and identified entities to target, she said. The EU moved more slowly because it had not made the same preparations.

“Sanctions are something transactional that can be imposed and then lifted,” she said.

The Trump administration has nevertheless imposed substantial restrictions. On October 22nd 2025, US Treasury sanctioned Rosneft and Lukoil, linking the decision to Russia’s lack of serious commitment to a peace process. The outgoing Biden administration had targeted Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas that January, alongside more than 180 vessels.

European sanctions can also be lifted. The Council of the EU describes its restrictions as temporary and subject to review, with scope for relief when their objectives, or meaningful steps towards them, are achieved. Brooks’s criticism concerns how sanctions are used, rather than whether they can ever be lifted.

Brooks points to American banking relationships as a reason US sanctions affect businesses beyond the country’s borders.

Treasury’s October announcement warned that foreign financial institutions conducting certain transactions involving Russian entities blocked under Executive Order 14024 could themselves face sanctions. The risk extends to banks outside the United States.

The EU vessel restrictions discussed in the tanker study prohibit designated ships from accessing EU ports and maritime services. These measures disrupt access to European facilities, while buyers and service providers elsewhere may continue handling the trade.

KSE’s comparison covered 144 US-designated vessels and 195 EU-designated vessels. Ships sanctioned by both were excluded. Vessels could still be subject to sanctions imposed by other coalition members. The results describe those vessels’ activity, rather than Russia’s total oil exports.

The disruption also changed how the US-designated group moved crude. KSE found longer voyages and much greater reliance on transfers between ships. Some activity returned, but through more complex transport arrangements. The EU-designated group experienced a more gradual decline, with less disruption to established logistics. The study does not establish how those changes affected Russia’s overall export earnings.

Brooks said she did not think governments measured success by counting sanctioned vessels. She instead stressed how Russia had adapted to restrictions.

Early sanctions packages raised the cost of shipping Russian oil and gas, she said. Russia then developed alternatives that made later measures easier to circumvent.

“They’ve already developed workarounds through the shadow fleet,” she said.

She draws a parallel with military assistance to Ukraine. Gradual deliveries gave Russia time to prepare, she said, reducing their effect.

In October 2023, US Treasury sanctioned Lumber Marine, the registered owner of SCF Primorye, and identified the tanker as blocked property. Treasury said it had carried Russian crude sold above the price cap while using US service providers.

KSE’s July 2024 Russia Chartbook, citing Kpler tracking data, traced a later cargo across three ships. SCF Primorye loaded crude at Novorossiysk on April 24th 2024. The cargo was transferred to Ocean Hermana off Malaysia on June 3rd, then to Saint Light on June 25th. KSE reported that Saint Light delivered it to Chittagong, Bangladesh, on July 2nd. KSE did not report the shipment’s transport costs or sale price.

In its August 2026 analysis, the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) estimated that Russian seaborne crude imports by Shandong Yulong Petrochemical, sanctioned by the EU and UK, rose 141 per cent compared with July. Restrictions had not stopped the buyer from obtaining substantial supplies.

Continued shipments do not, by themselves, show how much Russia earns from its oil exports.

In its September Russian Oil Tracker, summarised on October 2nd, KSE estimated that total Russian exports of crude oil and petroleum products fell to 6.4 million barrels a day in August, their lowest level since 2018. Revenues nevertheless increased by $300 million from July to $13.9 billion as higher prices offset the fall in volumes. KSE linked the export reduction to Ukrainian attacks on refineries and export infrastructure. These are export receipts, not profits after shipping costs or direct revenues to the Russian budget.

Russia was selling less oil but earning slightly more.

CREA estimated that Urals crude traded about $22 a barrel below Brent, the international oil benchmark, in August. The figures do not establish how much of the discount sanctions caused. Rising global prices can increase earnings even while Russian oil sells at a discount.

The price cap was designed to keep Russian oil flowing while reducing Moscow’s revenues. Under the policy, coalition providers may supply shipping and insurance services for Russian oil sold at or below the applicable ceiling. US Treasury’s December 2022 fact sheet set out the aims of limiting Russian earnings and maintaining global supply.

Asked what evidence showed that more sanctions could change Vladimir Putin’s decision to continue the war, Brooks replied, “I don’t know if we have that evidence.”

“It doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t try to use all tools that we have,” she added.

Brooks also sees continued sanctions as a signal of support to Ukraine. Asked whether Europe was willing to bear the costs of greater pressure, she said EU member states had shown resilience because “Ukrainian security is European security”.

Sanctions disrupted the tankers studied, but the SCF Primorye cargo reached its destination through other ships. Higher prices also helped lift Russia’s August oil earnings despite lower exports. Assessing the effect on Russian revenues requires tracking cargo carried by replacement vessels as well as the prices buyers pay. Whether those economic costs can change Putin’s decision to continue the war remains uncertain.

— Ana Pisarenco, Independent Media Project eurOpinii