DEAR READER,

Happy Easter week to all who celebrate! We will keep it short this time: Hungary heads to the polls this Sunday in what may be the region’s most closely watched election, and naturally, we have got you covered.

Enjoy reading this week’s “brief”!

— Giorgi Beroshvili, Editor

On April 12th, Hungarians will cast their votes to elect a new government. The stakes are higher than ever in the last 20 years, not only because there is a real chance to defeat Orbán, but also because the elections have strong international connotations.

After winning four elections in a row with a two-thirds majority, Fidesz seemed almost untouchable in Hungarian politics. Now in 2026, Viktor Orbán’s party is lagging behind the opposition in most polls with a margin of double digits. The popularity of the government started to drop in February 2024, when a pardon scandal ended the Fidesz-nominated Katalin Novák’s presidency, which led to the appearance of Péter Magyar in political life. As a former member of Fidesz and ex-husband of Orbán’s former Minister of Justice, Judit Varga, Magyar started his political movement in March, winning 30% of the votes in the EU elections held in June the same year. Although Fidesz tried to discredit Magyar and his Tisza party many times, the previously successful tools and accusations (be it real or politically fabricated) didn’t seem to work against them.

After two years of political fighting, the official election campaign kicked off in late February 2026. By that time, however, the society had been polarized so much that it has become hard for these two “realities” to reconcile. The government – finishing a very unsuccessful term economically – is trying to turn the voters’ attention to foreign policy and security threats, while claiming that they are the only “secure choice”. Their narrative claims that the EU and Ukraine want to intervene in the elections and help their puppet, Péter Magyar, to power so they can drag Hungary into the war. Orbán goes as far in his rhetoric as claiming that on April 12th Hungarians will choose between himself and Zelenskyy.

Meanwhile Tisza, combined with anti-government media, are trying to highlight all the disadvantageous policies of Fidesz. The lack of progressive reforms in education, health care and rail transport and the pro-Russian foreign policy have always been major topics for the opposition. Yet, the main focus now is on political crimes and scandals of the government. Since February, several Fidesz-related affairs have come to light, including emissions of harmful substances from a battery factory with the administration’s awareness, the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ close ties to Moscow, accusation of the government using counter-intelligence for political purposes, and a documentary highlighting how Fidesz uses systematic intimidation and manipulation to get the votes from the most vulnerable segments of society.

Although the elections take place on Sunday, it is still hard to predict the outcome. There are many aspects to bear in mind. Firstly, the election system is mixed majoritarian, with dual voting and compensation mechanisms. As a result, Fidesz could still receive more mandates even if Tisza wins the popular vote by a small margin.

Turnout will also play a huge role. Undoubtedly the record of participation (70,21%) will be broken, but it’s unclear who will benefit from it. According to recent polls, Tisza’s mobilisation is close to 100%, while Fidesz is still under 90%, therefore a high turnout favours the main opposition only to a certain level. Very high participation (80%+) would probably benefit the current government.

Small parties could also be decisive. Last year a trend emerged, where small parties with public support between 0,1 and 3% started to withdraw in favour of Tisza, in order to defeat Orbán. As a result, only three minor parties were able to field a national list for the elections. Concerning the Democratic Coalition (DK) and Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP), many of their supporters have Tisza as a secondary preference. According to polls, neither DK nor MKKP will be able to surpass the 5% threshold. As their main aim is to defeat Orbán, the pressure is increasing for their candidates to withdraw, as opposition votes cast for them would otherwise be wasted. The only small party with a realistic chance to pass the 5% threshold is the far-right Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) – though a high turnout would lower their chances as well. If the far-right gets into parliament and no party receives a majority, the Our Homeland party could become the decisive force. This would likely favour Fidesz, as the two parties are ideologically close.

Lastly, due to the international importance of the elections, foreign interference could play a bigger role than before. In case Orbán – a prominent symbol of right-wing populism – loses, it can negatively affect the global alt-right and far-right community. Additionally, a change of government in Hungary would not only help cooperation and speed up decision-making within the EU, but also hinder Moscow in its ongoing hybrid operations against the EU and NATO.

Although the government warns about intervention from Brussels and Ukraine, the main actor who is notorious for interfering in elections in the western world is Russia. As the relations between Budapest and Moscow are quite close, the possibility that Putin’s regime and Fidesz are coordinating their actions to keep Orbán in power should not be excluded. What further complicates the situation is that Donald Trump, due to ideological reasons, is also endorsing the current prime minister, while other western allies, directly or indirectly, are more supportive towards Tisza.

All things considered, if nothing extraordinary happens until Sunday, the most possible outcome is a three-party parliament with Tisza winning the popular-vote followed closely by Fidesz, and Our Homeland just surpassing the threshold. Yet, due to the election system an above-mentioned result would not automatically imply that Magyar’s party will be able to form a majority government. Furthermore, as new stories are getting revealed day by day, the possibility of a black swan event that could drastically change public opinion should not be excluded either. Fidesz have already showed on March 15th that they are capable of implementing a (literal) false-flag operation and it was also revealed that a Russian SVR officer has suggested that “drastic actions might be necessary” to turn the ties to Orbán’s favour. We will have to wait and see. One way or another it will go beyond an ordinary election.

— Ludwik Botfy (pseud.), Budapest-based analyst

European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) — Office Manager & Assistant to Head of Berlin Office (May 2026–Aug 2027) — A full-time, fixed-term role supporting the day-to-day operations of ECFR’s Berlin office, which serves as both a national office and organisational headquarters. The position combines office management, administrative support to the Head of Office, and coordination of events and stakeholder engagement, ensuring smooth operations and a well-organised, collaborative work environment. Responsibilities include managing office administration, coordinating meetings and travel, overseeing budgets and communications, and organising high-level events and activities. Ideal candidates have 2–3 years of relevant experience, strong organisational and communication skills, and proficiency in English and German. Based in Berlin; candidates must be eligible to work in Germany. Deadline: April 6, 2026.