DEAR READER,

As the world seems to be jumping from one historic moment to the next (hence the bulky top stories of the week), we are keeping our eyes on the latest escalation around Iran, this time reaching the South Caucasus. Last week, drones struck the airport in Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan, bringing the conflict even closer to the region. We decided to ask Murad Muradov, deputy director of the Topchubashov Center, to walk us through what this means for Azerbaijan, and whether Baku is likely to respond. You can read more in his expert opinion.

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Enjoy reading this week’s “brief”!

— Giorgi Beroshvili, Editor

The bombs that started to drop on Iran in the morning hours of February 28th signalled the ultimate dismantling of the global order, which started with the invasion of Ukraine four years earlier. While this dismantling began with the institutions and norms of international law, it has now reached even the basic assumptions about rational foreign-policy behaviour. The United States appears to lack both a coherent long-term vision of its objectives in this conflict and a full awareness of the growing array of risks that each new day the war brings. This makes the task of foreseeing their further decisions more difficult than ever, adding to a huge pool of uncertainties.

These uncertainties are multiplied by the “madman strategy” adopted by lran as its modus of response to the US-Israeli attack. This strategy envisages inflicting maximum harm to the global economy, connectivity and infrastructure in the hope to maximise the cost of the war to third countries so that they start to pressure the US to switch to negotiations. This explains regular Iranian strikes on the Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Untied Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar (not limited to American military bases) as well as the closure of the Hormuz strait to oil tankers. These actions have affected countries that depend heavily on oil and gas exports, on imports of essential goods, and on the protection of the US security umbrella. So far they have refrained from responding directly. Yet if Washington fails to protect them from further strikes and the accompanying economic disruption, they may start to reconsider their policies in ways unfavourable to the West, possibly setting off a wider chain reaction.

As the region lying at the crossroads between several major powers and sharing a long border with Iran, the South Caucasus could not have remained unaffected by these major perturbations. The last doubts were dispelled when four Iranian drones hit the Nakhchivan exclave of Azerbaijan, including its airport, the only means of uninterrupted communication with the mainland. This attack prompted a very severe response from the president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev who called it “unmanly and coward”, while shutting cargo transit with Iran and ordering the armed forces to be on high alert. Two days later, in an uncharacteristic gesture, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized for “all strikes ... against neighbouring countries that didn’t participate in attacks on Iran”. Since the Gulf states, housing US military infrastructure, do not fit this description, there are little doubts he meant Azerbaijan specifically. On Sunday, the two leaders held a rather positive telephone conversation, after which Baku re-opened the border with Iran for trucks and resumed flights to Nakhchivan. However, it happened after an unambiguous statement by the Turkish foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, who strongly warned Tehran against repeated assaults against Turkish or Azerbaijani territory. This simultaneously demonstrates the significance of the Baku-Ankara alliance and Iran’s unwillingness to confront Türkiye.

Nevertheless, the risk that the region may be drawn into the conflict remains significant. Azerbaijan, given its strained relationship with its southern neighbour, appears particularly vulnerable. The revolutionary guard, the IRGC, a bastion of Iranian hardliners, has long viewed Baku with hostility and has repeatedly accused it of assisting Israeli operations against the Islamic Republic. The war has further strengthened the IRGC’s position within the elite, and the elevation of Khamenei’s son Mojtaba — an ultra-conservative figure possibly further radicalized by the death of several members of his family in an Israeli strike — to the position of supreme leader does not bode well.

On Saturday, the IGRC openly disavowed Pezeshkian’s statement, and in order to further undermine the moderates’ reputation, they might consider conducting another strike against Azerbaijan. Another incentive is the latter’s growing importance as an energy supplier and transport hub. With Gulf oil effectively out of market and global prices skyrocketing over $100 per barrel, disruption of Azerbaijani oil and gas export could exacerbate global economic chaos — something Iranian hardliners would likely favour. At the same time, Azerbaijan turned into a bottleneck for the connection between Europe and Central Asia, yet another critical region whose significance should grow as large swathes of Eurasia are getting enflamed.

Azerbaijan is affected by this war also through the issue of Iranian Azerbaijanis, the second largest ethnic group in Iran who mostly live compactly in the immediate vicinity to their ethnic kin in the north. Thus far, Azerbaijanis have not been actively involved in the anti-government movement, however if either US/Israeli strikes or Iranian measures to curb opposition start to cause growing casualties in the region, popular pressure on Baku to interfere somehow may become significant. Azerbaijan, with all its interest in regional stability and inviolability of borders, will not be able to just sit back if Iran’s Azerbaijanis are subject to humanitarian catastrophe or large-scale repression.

The war in Iran could also impact the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Washington’s heavy involvement, particularly its role in the planned TRIPP corridor whose construction was set to start in the second half of 2026, had already put it into Tehran’s spotlight, and this negativity is likely to exacerbate. In any case, works on the TRIPP will likely not start until the conflict in Iran ends, at least if the latter retains capacity for inflicting damage. Azerbaijan and Armenia should then discuss alternative options and scenarios so that their peace process doesn’t fall prey to the Iranian conflict.

At the same time, Tehran and probably Moscow, might be tempted to use the momentum to try to re-ignite the conflict between Baku and Yerevan, acting through the revanchist opposition and the general population’s mistrust and fears. As the election in Armenia approaches, and with it the potential to disrupt stability, there is a need for the two countries to discuss and implement pro-active measured aimed at reassuring each other — and their own citizens — about the normalization process. In this regards, suggestions made by some Armenian experts to grant a humanitarian corridor through the Syunik region to Nakhchivan in case Baku needs it, seems really promising.

— Murad Muradov, Deputy Director of the Topchubashov Center

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