DEAR READER,

During the night, Russia targeted the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. The monastery, which is a UNESCO World Heritage site and one of the oldest in Eastern Europe, was established in 1051. President Zelenskyy described this as an assault on the essence of Ukraine, while Moscow refuted the allegations. This incident coincides with the commencement of the G7 summit in France, suggesting a deliberate timing.

In this week's Expert Opinion, Clara Sandgren examines the European Union's 21st sanctions package, which focuses on Russia's so-called “shadow fleet”. The opinion analyses the intricacies of legal loopholes, maritime regulations, and the gradual impact of sustained pressure, so definitely check it out!

Additionally, for those interested, our latest episode of Talk Eastern Europe explores Montenegro's journey towards EU accession, click the banner below to watch the video.

Enjoy reading this week’s “brief”!

— Giorgi Beroshvili, Editor

In the past week, the European Commission proposed a 21st sanctions package targeting Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”, a network of ageing, often uninsured vessels used to transport oil despite Western sanctions. If adopted, the package would blacklist an additional 30 vessels, bringing the total number of sanctioned ships to more than 600, and extend restrictions from the ships themselves to also include ports, refineries, traders and other infrastructure facilitating Russian energy exports.

This new round builds on the EU’s previous sanctions package, which expanded anti-circumvention measures against third countries and blacklisted logistics global hubs used to facilitate Russian oil exports. If approved by member states, the 21st package will continue this approach and in addition to penalising primary shipping vessels will also ban secondary service providers such as bunkering (refueling) and logistical support operators.

The shadow fleet emerged in 2022 following an EU/G7+ price cap on Russian crude. To maintain its economic lifeline, Russia developed a parallel fleet of vessels operating under opaque ownership structures, often changing flag status and lacking adequate insurance and oversight. It is difficult to overstate the importance of these exports: oil and gas are fundamental tenets of the Russian economy, accounting for roughly 30-40% of federal budget revenues and close to half of export earnings. Additionally, skyrocketing oil prices due to the Middle East war have handed the Kremlin a massive financial windfall that it is desperate to protect.

While the shadow fleet operates in multiple waters, the Baltic Sea is perhaps the most critical site. Almost half (48%) of Russian oil exports are shipped from Russian terminals through the Gulf of Finland to reach global markets. At the same time, the Baltic Sea is dense with critical underwater infrastructure and surrounded almost entirely by NATO member states. The shadow fleet has consequently triggered major anxieties in coastal nation capitals, as it has also been linked to Russian grey zone activities; reports of irregular vessel behaviour, interference of navigation systems and several incidents involving damaged undersea cables suggest that the shadow fleet is being used to probe Western responses and test vulnerabilities. Many of these vessels – due to their age and poor maintenance - are also ticking environmental bombs. A major oil spill in the small, enclosed Baltic Sea could have disastrous ecological consequences.

However, responding to shadow fleet activity is not straightforward. The sea is divided into distinct areas of jurisdiction, and international maritime law grants extensive protections to vessels, including the right of innocent passage through territorial waters. As a result, coastal states generally need clear evidence of unlawful activity before being able to intervene against foreign-flagged vessels - making it difficult to act against Russian ships operating under plausible deniability. Varying threat perceptions across the nations also limit coordinated action. While countries such as Sweden and France have taken a more assertive position in regard to boarding and detaining suspect vessels, others, including Estonia, have stated that they will not act against the shadow fleet out of fear of escalation.

Despite these divisions, Baltic Sea states have recently started taking more decisive measures. In December 2025, 14 European states issued a joint declaration outlining conditions under which ships may be subject to inspection. This includes a vessel’s failure to stick to a consistent and verifiable flag, allowing authorities to treat them as “stateless” and therefore subject them to intervention. Consequently, boardings have increased during the spring. Predictably, Russia has strongly criticised these measures, bringing up accusations of “piracy”, warned of possible retaliation against Western commercial shipping and increased its presence in the region.

While the Commission’s 21st sanctions package will not stop Russian oil exports overnight, the gradual tightening of loopholes indicates a strategy of cumulative pressure to gradually squeeze Moscow’s economic engine. This strategy is reinforced by the efforts of individual nations; while they are often reduced to intercepting one vessel at a time, these interceptions are deliberately designed to make shadow fleet operations as time-consuming and costly for Russia as possible. At the same time, the principle of free passage is politically and legally difficult to challenge, and something that is fundamentally desirable to uphold, even despite security concerns. Coastal states therefore face a dilemma in seeking to tighten enforcement against the shadow fleet while also upholding international maritime law and preserving the sea as a free space for commerce.

— Clara Sandgren, Political Scientist focusing on Central & Eastern Europe

German Marshall Fund (GMF) — NEXUS: Next Generation Security Exchange 2026 — A leadership programme for emerging security experts from Europe, Japan, and the United States focused on strengthening transatlantic and Indo-Pacific cooperation. The inaugural cohort will bring together ten Master’s and PhD students to explore nuclear deterrence, non-proliferation, alliance politics, and international nuclear history while building expertise in US–Japan–Europe security relations. The programme combines interactive online seminars with an immersive training programme in Washington, DC, in November 2026 and offers participants the opportunity to publish a policy-oriented article. Travel, accommodation, and meals are fully funded. Open to Master’s and PhD students from Europe, Japan, and the United States. Application deadline: 30 June 2026.