DEAR READER,

We're back from our summer break, and we couldn't be more thrilled! Get ready to see us in your inboxes every Monday once again. We've got some updates lined up as we gear up for our 2-year anniversary in September, so stay tuned! But for this Monday, we're easing back into briefing you.

Today is also a special day because it's the 35th anniversary of Ukraine's independence: Happy Independence Day to all our Ukrainian friends & readers! With European leaders, including the UK's new prime minister Andy Burnham, making their way to Kyiv, we're diving into a hot topic that has surrounded Ukraine lately: elections. More on that in our expert opinion.

Enjoy reading this week’s “brief”!

— Giorgi Beroshvili, Editor

Ukraine’s parliament and presidency have remained unchanged since 2019. Under normal circumstances, the country would have held parliamentary elections in 2023 and presidential elections in 2024. Instead, amid Russia’s full-scale invasion, the vote was postponed indefinitely. The reason is not merely the volatility of wartime politics. Ukraine’s constitution and legislation, which has been in force since the outbreak of war in 2022, explicitly prohibits any elections under martial law. Yet the debate surrounding electoral politics during wartime refuses to fade. On the contrary, it is intensifying. In recent months, discussions about holding elections despite the war have gained momentum not only within Ukraine, but internationally. Pressure from Washington, combined with the threat to waive US security guarantees if Ukraine does not elect a new president and hold a peace deal referendum, has pushed the issue into the geopolitical spotlight. At the same time, Moscow eagerly exploits the postponement, branding Ukraine’s leadership as “illegitimate” in its ongoing information warfare.

Peace before or after the polls?

International practice suggests that democracies at war more often defer elections until hostilities cease rather than treat elections as a cure for conflict. Some exceptions include the Canadian federal elections in 1917 during the First World War and US elections during the Civil War, as well as during the world wars of the 20th century. Yet in both cases, with the exception of the American Civil War, active combat was not taking place on their territories. This contrasts with the United Kingdom during the Second World War. As London endured sustained bombing, elections were suspended. The same parliament remained in place for nearly a decade, prioritizing the continuity of governance over electoral turnover.

Historically, international institutions approach wartime elections with caution. In its resolution “Elections in Times of Crisis”, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) notes that elections under martial law risk becoming a contradiction in terms. Universal suffrage requires freedom of movement, open campaigning, and basic security conditions that are difficult to guarantee during active conflict. Beyond these principles lie practical challenges: millions of displaced citizens, occupied territories, damaged infrastructure, and the safety of polling stations.

Nevertheless, if elections were to become a diplomatic prerequisite for peace negotiations, Kyiv has signalled its readiness to adapt legislation accordingly. But legislation alone cannot guarantee feasibility. The success of wartime elections would depend not only on Ukraine’s institutional capacity, but equally on Russia’s willingness to halt hostilities and on credible, enforceable security guarantees from international partners.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has proposed a 60-day full ceasefire to make elections technically possible. Jokingly, he has remarked that Kyiv would be ready to cease fire too for Russia – if Russia itself agreed to hold real elections. In response, however, Moscow has agreed only to a one-day pause. Under Ukrainian law, regular elections require a 90-day campaign period, while early elections demand at least 60 days. Even the shortest legally viable timeline, therefore, requires sustained stability. A single day would not serve for anything in practice.

Even if a genuine 60-day ceasefire were achieved, however, further questions would immediately arise. How would voting be organized for millions of internally displaced persons and refugees abroad? How to ensure democratic voting for the military? Could Ukrainians vote under Russian occupation? Ukraine thus confronts a dilemma that few modern democracies have faced on this scale: how to protect the integrity of the ballot while defending the survival of the state itself.

Challenge abroad

Up to nine million Ukrainians fled abroad after the full-scale invasion in search of safety. While many have secured the right to live and work in host countries, they remain Ukrainian citizens and retain their inherent right to vote. This figure adds up to those who emigrated before 2022 but preserved their citizenship. Taken together, this represents a substantial share of the electorate that the Ukrainian state cannot afford to overlook if it seeks a representative and legitimate outcome.

Distance should not dilute one’s political voice. No matter how far from home, every citizen must have the opportunity to express their will. Yet that right risks being constrained by limited voting infrastructure abroad. At present, Ukraine operates only 104 polling stations outside its territory – a number that struggled to meet demand even before the war. Under the current framework, voting takes place at consulates, further narrowing access: only around 300,000 Ukrainians are officially registered with them and therefore eligible to vote there.

Ensuring meaningful turnout overseas would therefore require procedural adjustments. One option would be a proactive information campaign inviting Ukrainians abroad to confirm their intention to vote and provide updated data on their place of residence. A clearer mapping of the diaspora would allow the state to plan more effectively, though it would not eliminate the risk of overwhelming an already limited consular network.

Another possibility is to negotiate with host governments the opening of additional polling stations beyond consular premises. Ukraine’s “Unity Hubs” – state-supported centres established to assist citizens abroad – could potentially serve as supplementary voting locations. However, such arrangements would need to respect domestic legislation in receiving states, some of which restrict certain forms of foreign political activity on their territory.

Certainly, any future vote must be accompanied by a clear and comprehensive information campaign explaining citizens’ rights and the practical steps required to exercise them from abroad. The 2019 Ukrainian elections offer a telling precedent. In the second round, only 13 per cent of citizens registered abroad cast their ballots, which is a fairly modest turnout. The reasons for this extended beyond long queues and logistical constraints: limited awareness of procedures also played a role.

Displaced electorate

In addition, around four million Ukrainians are internally displaced, having left the frontline or occupied territories for relatively safer regions inside Ukraine. This internal migration presents one of the most complex challenges for any future elections. Under Ukraine’s current electoral framework, citizens vote according to their officially registered place of residence, as listed in the State Register of Voters. The difficulty here lies in the fact that this register no longer reflects reality.

Consider the case of Bakhmut. The town is located in the east of Ukraine and was devastated by war before falling under Russian occupation. It has been effectively emptied of its population. Officially, the number of registered voters there has decreased by only two per cent and the electorate remains on paper. In practice, it has scattered across the country.

This discrepancy demonstrates the urgency of updating voter data. The Central Election Commission would need access to verified information on the actual place of residence of internally displaced persons in order to re-register citizens accordingly. Equal voting conditions must be guaranteed for IDPs regardless of when or from where they were forced to move. The solution, however, cannot be purely administrative. Internally displaced citizens themselves must be encouraged to update their voting address, since the election authorities cannot do so without their active participation. That makes simplification essential. The re-registration process would need to be clear, accessible, and ideally digitalized to ensure speed and efficiency.

Yet infrastructure alone will not resolve the issue. As with voting abroad, awareness remains decisive. A comprehensive information system must be in place to ensure that every displaced citizen understands both their rights and the practical steps required to exercise them. As the war has shifted where citizens live, the electoral system will need to reflect this new reality.

Similarly, those in the Ukrainian military, who are engaged daily in a life-threatening defence of the state, retain the same political rights as any civilian citizen. Whether elections are held during or after the war, every soldier must also be able to exercise the right to vote. For those stationed behind the lines, voting according to their place of registration would be feasible. Yet the situation is different on the frontline. Soldiers cannot simultaneously abandon their positions to travel to their home regions. One proposed solution is the creation of temporary mobile polling stations in frontline areas. To simplify the procedure, draft legislation would allow soldiers to vote using their service identification rather than passports.

Safeguards, however, are essential. Polling stations must remain under civilian administration to prevent undue influence linked to the military hierarchy. The secrecy of the ballot must also be protected. If the number of mobile stations is insufficient, overcrowding could undermine confidentiality and, ultimately, trust in the process.

Transparency poses another challenge. International observation missions are a key component of electoral credibility. Ensuring their safety in frontline regions would be difficult, and their willingness to deploy under such conditions is uncertain. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission withdrew from Ukraine in 2022, leaving open the question of whether similar missions would return during active hostilities.

Beyond logistics and oversight lies the issue of access to information. Soldiers stationed in relatively stable areas may follow political developments, but those engaged in intense combat operations have limited opportunity or time to monitor campaigns. Even if granted pre-election leave, many would likely prioritize medical rehabilitation or time with their families over political engagement. Additionally, active suffrage must be matched by passive suffrage. Many members of Ukraine’s armed forces had civilian careers before mobilization and may wish to participate directly in political life. As citizens, they are entitled to do so. Yet candidacy itself carries financial and procedural barriers. Such costs can deter participation, particularly for those just leaving military service.

If elections are to be genuinely inclusive, measures could be considered to reduce financial obstacles for military candidates or to provide structured support mechanisms. At a minimum, service members seeking to stand for office would require guaranteed leave to register and campaign on an equal footing with civilian contenders.

The vote under occupation

Undoubtedly, Ukraine cannot organize elections in territories currently occupied by Russia. Any formal arrangements or negotiations on that matter would be largely illusory. Kyiv is unable to guarantee the integrity of a democratic process in areas fully controlled by an occupying power. Yet the issue does not end there. Many Ukrainians living under occupation still identify as citizens of Ukraine and would want to cast their vote as such. Their political will does not disappear with territorial control. The question, therefore, is how and whether that will can be accommodated.

Information is the first barrier. Conducting an election campaign presupposes access to pluralistic media and open political debate. In occupied territories, independent sources of information are suppressed and replaced with centrally curated Russian propaganda. Providing alternative channels of communication is not only technically difficult but potentially dangerous. The Russian-installed authorities closely monitor digital activity: even indications of pro-Ukrainian sentiment on personal devices may expose individuals to detention or violence. Any attempt to maintain links must therefore balance outreach with the physical safety of those involved.

The second dimension concerns mobility. Being trapped under occupation should not automatically deprive individuals of their voting rights. Ukraine could allow citizens from occupied territories to vote once they reach government-controlled areas or third countries, excluding Russia and Belarus. However, encouraging people to “leave occupation in order to vote” carries serious risks. Russian forces have established so-called “filtration centres” along exit routes, where civilians are interrogated about their political views and personal affiliations. Passage is neither automatic nor safe. For some, the attempt to leave could result in detention or worse.

Given the scale of the challenges, postal or digital voting may appear to be logical solutions. In practice, however, both options pose considerable risk, arguably outweighing their advantages. Postal voting raises logistical concerns. It is difficult to guarantee that ballots would be delivered, returned, and processed within legally defined timeframes. Delays could undermine both credibility and confidence in the results. At the same time, the complexity of the procedure might discourage participation, particularly among younger voters, potentially depressing turnout.

Digital voting, meanwhile, could be linked to Ukraine’s Diia application, the governmental digital platform which provides a wide range of public services to Ukrainian citizens at home and abroad. Compared to postal voting, Diia offers greater simplicity and accessibility. Yet ensuring stable operation during a nationwide vote would be technically demanding, especially given past system overloads, including during the Eurovision national selection conducted through the app. Public trust presents an even greater obstacle. According to recent surveys, 60 per cent of Ukrainians would not trust a fully digital voting procedure. And both postal and online systems are widely perceived as more vulnerable to external interference or manipulation, particularly in the context of ongoing war and cyber threats. For these reasons, the government is currently ruling out both alternatives.

There is one compelling argument in favour of digital mechanisms: accessibility. Previous elections revealed persistent barriers for people with disabilities due to poorly adapted polling stations and limited assistance. Today, with thousands of wounded soldiers and civilians, ensuring accessible voting has become even more urgent. Digital tools could, at a minimum, expand participation for those physically unable to attend polling stations.

A long to-do list

Aside from the elections themselves, digital solutions may still play a constructive role beyond casting ballots. They could facilitate voter re-registration based on actual residence and help collect data from citizens abroad regarding their intention to vote. In this sense, technology may not replace traditional voting, but could strengthen the administrative foundations on which any future election would depend.

Nevertheless, taking all these challenges together, it becomes clear that holding elections during a full-scale war would be an exceptionally challenging undertaking. Even if the security situation improves and martial law is lifted, many of the structural obstacles would remain and need to be addressed immediately. The war has reshaped the electorate geographically, administratively, and socially, and the system will have to respond accordingly.

To ensure that the next elections are democratic, representative, and respectful of fundamental rights, Kyiv would need to first conduct a comprehensive audit of both security conditions and voting infrastructure, update the State Register of Voters, implement a clear and targeted information campaign, and work closely with partner countries to facilitate participation abroad. Such steps will require coordinated action across institutions, carefully adjusted legislation, and, above all, sufficient time.

Originally published in Issue 3/2026

— Mariia Didkovska, Project coordinator at the Kyiv-based Institute of American Studies