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This week’s expert opinion zooms in on the Western Balkans, specifically, the issue of state property in Bosnia. At first glance, it might sound like a dry legal dispute, but as our contributor Erdin Kadunić argues , it’s anything but. Behind the paperwork lies a geopolitical tug-of-war that could decide whether Bosnia moves closer to Europe or drifts into the orbit of outside powers.

Enjoy reading this week’s “brief”!

— Giorgi Beroshvili, Editor

Few issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina carry as much weight for the country's sovereignty, stability, and Euro-Atlantic future as the question of who controls its state property. At first glance, it might seem a technical or legal matter. In reality, it is a geopolitical battleground that could determine whether Bosnia drifts toward Europe or becomes an outpost for outside powers.

State property in Bosnia amounts to over 53 percent of the country's territory — around 2.7 million hectares of forests, pastures, rivers, mineral resources, and strategic sites. It is the backbone of the state. Whoever controls this property wields enormous political and economic power.

According to Bosnia's constitution and confirmed by court rulings, this property belongs exclusively to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet political leaders in Republika Srpska (RS), often backed by Belgrade and Moscow, have persistently tried to shift ownership to the entities. Such a move would allow local politicians to allocate or sell off land without any state oversight. The risk is clear: strategic assets could fall into the hands of actors hostile to Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic integration.

This issue first came into sharp focus in 2010, when Bosnia was conditionally granted a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) — the final step before full membership talks. For MAP activation, 63 prospective military sites had to be registered as state property, 23 of them located in RS. Then-Prime Minister Milorad Dodik agreed to this registration only on the condition that the rest of the country's state property be handed to the entities.

Former Presidency member Haris Silajdžić blocked the move, warning that such a handover would amount to a de facto partition of Bosnia. His stance underscored the essence of the debate: Bosnia's state property is not just land, but the very foundation of the state's integrity.

The wider geopolitical stakes

The consequences go far beyond Bosnia's borders. If entities gain control, foreign powers could acquire strategic locations alarmingly close to EU territory — only 70 kilometers from Zagreb or 150 kilometers from Vienna. This is not speculation: Bulgaria has already expressed alarm over Russia's "humanitarian center" in Niš, Serbia, which Western analysts describe as a disguised military base. Former Bulgarian ambassador Elena Poptodorova even warned that if Russia were to deploy S-400 systems there, it would cover all of Bulgaria and the Western Balkans.

Handing over state property to entities would therefore not just undermine Bosnia's sovereignty. It would open the door for Russian and Chinese influence to grow unchecked in the heart of the Balkans, threatening regional stability and Europe's security architecture.

Beyond geopolitics, there is the question of corruption. Bosnia's political landscape is already plagued by scandals involving the misuse of public resources. Granting entities unilateral control over assets worth hundreds of billions of euros would give corrupt elites a free hand to enrich themselves and entrench ethnic divisions.

In contrast, when property remains under state control, decisions must be taken by consensus at the national level. This ensures a degree of transparency and protects Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic orientation. A positive example remains the sale of land for the construction of the US Embassy in Sarajevo: the decision was made by the state, not by the Federation entity on whose territory the embassy was built.

As American historian Roy Casagranda once noted in a lecture, a state falls not when its leaders abdicate, but when it no longer controls its property. He argued that the Roman Empire truly "fell" not in 476 CE, but in 1453, when Constantinople — and with it the empire's property — was lost to the Ottomans. The lesson applies to Bosnia today: sovereignty is inseparable from ownership of land and resources.

The way forward

For Bosnia and Herzegovina, the path is clear. State property must remain in the hands of the state, not parceled out to entities or cantons. This is the only way to safeguard sovereignty, preserve territorial integrity, and ensure progress toward NATO and EU membership.

The international community, especially NATO and the EU, should also recognize the stakes. Allowing Bosnia's entities to manage state property would not only weaken the state but could open the Western Balkans to unwanted foreign military presence — undermining the very security of Europe.

Bosnia's state property is therefore more than a legal dispute. It is the frontline in a struggle between two futures: one anchored in stability, rule of law, and Euro-Atlantic integration, and another vulnerable to corruption, division, and outside influence. The choice should be clear — for Bosnia, and for Europe.

— Erdin Kadunić, Freelance Journalist