DEAR READER,

Last week Axios wrote that the US has been quietly working with Russia on a new plan to end the war in Ukraine. The first draft got a polite nod from Moscow but made Kyiv and Europe pretty anxious. However, over the weekend, US and Ukrainian negotiators rolled out an “updated and refined peace framework”, with Europe chiming in. The details are still in flux, so we will keep an eye on it and hit you with our take next Monday.

Meanwhile, we are zooming in on Hungary. With the pre-election campaign underway, we realized we have been talking about Hungary a lot, but we have not addressed the main question: whether Péter Magyar’s TISZA party can put an end to Viktor Orbán’s 16-year-long hegemony. Akos Kovacs will break down the political landscape and what to watch as things heat up.

Enjoy reading this week’s “brief”!

— Giorgi Beroshvili, Editor

Next April, Hungarians will be casting their votes in what looks to be the most contested parliamentary elections the country has seen in a long time. The main question is whether Péter Magyar’s TISZA party can put an end to Viktor Orbán’s 16-year-long hegemony. As the elections approach, the campaign is already heating up, characterized by immense mobilization on both sides. On the one hand, Orbán’s FIDESZ is establishing its own community while also courting the undecideds. On the other, Magyar has just announced his candidates in an attempt to line up for the final showdown.

Until now, Orbán’s propaganda machine has been struggling to recover from the multiple crises it has been shaken by recently and to stall the TISZA’s explosive rise. Magyar has appeared to be immune to the character assassination attempts waged against him, and it took nearly two years for the pro-government spin doctors to regain the grip on the political agenda. Orbán’s squad is slowly adapting to the new conditions and has just recently launched a multi-faceted, but far from perfect, counter-attack to seize back the initiative.

To begin with, FIDESZ and its vast media empire carry on its harsh de-legitimization campaigns against its opponents on the domestic stage. Pro-government outlets have been constantly depicting Magyar as “the puppet of Brussels and Kyiv” and accusing TISZA of plunging Hungary into war. These messages are transmitted via various channels, showcasing the diverse toolkit at Orbán’s disposal. Besides the massive network of pro-government mouthpieces, misleading AI-generated videos have also begun to be utilized, with the prime minister himself sharing them.

In parallel, the government has kick-started another “national consultation”, this time on the hypothetical tax increases of TISZA. Such non-binding surveys are recurring instruments of the Orbán regime that aim to back the government’s initiatives and keep the voting base engaged. In line with this, thousands of defamation posters flooded the country as a result of a covertly financed billboard campaign, again, a distinguishing feature of the Orbán era.

In addition to the demonizing messages, Orbán has also put the indecisive voters in his crosshairs. Contrary to the beginning of 2025, when Orbán had labelled the opposition as “stink bugs”, he has conceivably softened his tone. For instance, he urged his supporters to speak to the “misled” Hungarians and invited the “peace-wanting” Hungarians to join their forces. This trend, which can indicate a shrinking support for the government, is further justified by Orbán’s mysterious shift, which saw him restart giving interviews to relatively independent media, a phenomenon unprecedented in recent years.

Notwithstanding, tensions have still been high, since the personal data of more than 200,000 TISZA supporters were leaked from the party’s mobile app. Later, the database became freely searchable, and it was disseminated by government-leaning outlets till the authorities finally put a stop to it. While Magyar frames the incident as a deliberate attack, government commentators suggest the responsibility lies with “Ukrainians”.

The issue significantly impacted Magyar’s position and further delayed the announcement of his candidates. Currently, TISZA is organising a two-round primary election to select who to run in the country’s 106 individual constituencies. The nominees predominantly come from civil society, and their successful performance is key to any regime change aspiration. Out of 199 seats in the parliament, 106 are decided by the first-past-the-post constituencies, and only 93 are from party lists.

Magyar’s nationwide political rallies have proven incredibly successful, which has encouraged Orbán to also leave the capital. Recently, the two rivals held their events simultaneously in Győr. FIDESZ’s “Anti-War Assembly” took place behind closed doors, while TISZA kept on taking to the streets. This mirroring already suggests that the rest of the campaign will be marked by this duality: the two camps pushing their own agendas, with minimal interaction, in an attempt to appear stronger to the still undecided. In light of that, polls should also be taken with a pinch of salt, as they are often only used to back one’s narrative.

At this stage, it seems that only two factors can profoundly influence the final outcome: Orbán’s ability to mask the economic hardships and serious, inexplicable communication mistakes. The former can set the trends, the latter, if occurs, can cause another landslide. We’ll see who errs first!

— Ákos Kovács, Member of the Central Europe Association Hungary