📩 Deal or no deal?

DEAR READER,

I am currently in Wojnowice, at the College of Eastern Europe for the third edition of the New Eastern Europe Think Tank School. It's been very exciting to connect with sharp, young minds as we discuss everything from think tanks’ influence on policy-making to security and disinformation. If Central and Eastern Europe is something you study or research, make sure to follow us on our LinkedIn page for more chances to get involved in our activities!

That aside, this week we are exploring the recent peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Our contributing editor, Tatevik Hovhannisyan, breaks down the details and what this could mean for the region in the expert opinion.

Enjoy reading this week’s “brief”!

— Giorgi Beroshvili, Editor

On March 13th 2025 Armenia and Azerbaijan issued separate statements confirming that they had finalised the key points of the draft “Agreement on Peace and the Establishment of Interstate Relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia”, surprising many observers of the almost 30-year Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

While international media and political leaders immediately celebrated the development, a closer look reveals that not everything seems so clear to lead the region to peace. The first signs of the absence of a total agreement between the parties was the refusal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan to issue a joint statement. The agreement, nevertheless, was unblocked after the negotiators agreed on two particularly controversial points, namely:

• Withdrawing, dismissing, or settling legal claims against each other currently filed in international courts, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ);

• Not deploying “third-party forces” on the common border.

Until recently, Armenia had not given in on these two points for several reasons. First, the withdrawal of the legal claims submitted to the ICJ for racial discrimination against Azerbaijan seemed likely to produce a condemnation of the country led by Ilham Aliyev and this would have increased international pressure against the rival neighbour. Secondly, the withdrawal of "third-party forces" refers to the presence of Russian armed forces on Armenian territory, as well as the EU civilian monitoring mission deployed along the border between the two countries. Although it does not represent a "foreign force", the mission does not please the Azerbaijani authorities as it prevents potential military manoeuvres aimed at putting pressure on Armenia at the negotiating table and, should the Azerbaijani leadership wish to do so, also to conquer further territory.

Armenia's step back on these two points, which represented the major negotiating cards in the hands of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, may have been favoured by the strong imbalance of power in the region at this stage in favour of Azerbaijan. Furthermore, Nikol Pashinyan's decision to give up these leverage points can be attributed to the internal political context and his strategy. Notably, with the election deadline approaching, Pashinyan would like to arrive to the electoral campaign with the peace agreement, no matter how strong the document is, to show any success after losing the war. In parallel, the Armenian Prime Minister may have given in to buy time and avoid a possible military escalation. Indeed, in the days before the announcement of an agreement, Azerbaijan started an intense hybrid warfare against Armenia. In particular, Azerbaijani government sources accused Armenia for opening fire against them on March 5th, cargo planes were also seen flying from Azerbaijan towards Israel on March 11th, and then, on March 12th, Baku accused Yerevan of wanting to “start a new war”, in fact repeating a now classic pattern that anticipated a large-scale attack by the Baku Forces in 2020. In this context, giving in on the two vital points may have been part of an Armenian strategy to “disarm” Azerbaijan at any price and expose its will to attack.

These hypotheses appear to be confirmed by the fact that Baku, in the hours following the announcement of an agreement between the two countries, began again to rhetorically attack its Armenian neighbour and reported new and repeated alleged violations of the truce along the border, probably in an attempt to immediately distance the spectre of peace. Indeed, the strength of the country led by Aliyev at this stage appears to be in no real interest in reaching an agreement. Strongly supported by Turkey, Azerbaijan in the three years since the Russian invasion of Ukraine has strengthened relations with both Russia and the European Union, for which it is a crucial gas supply partner. At the same time, Azerbaijan is supported with supplies of military technology by Israel, also as an anti-Iranian player, and there are clear ideological alignments with the new administration in the United States led by Donald Trump.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that on March 5th Baku proposed to close the office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), along with the four UN offices (UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR and UNICEF), considering their activities no longer necessary. The role of the ICRC, in particular, had until now been crucial in ensuring contact with Armenian prisoners of war who are facing a lack of transparency in the Azerbaijani courts.

Summarising this complex process, it appears that Azerbaijan will maintain its position as the dominant party, seeking to expand its gains without a formal peace agreement. Meanwhile, Armenia’s strategy of concession places it in a precarious situation, where such regular concessions offer no lasting peace, only a temporary reprieve from conflict. Without significant intervention from the international community, the risk of renewed hostilities still remains high.

— Tatevik Hovhannisyan, Contributing Editor to New Eastern Europe