DEAR READER,

Recently, I have been reflecting on the environmental impact of war. Last week marked two years since the destruction of the Kakhovka dam, which devastated the surrounding area and displaced tens of thousands. A few days ago, on the front near Toretsk, Azov brigade soliders stumbled upon something straight out of a dystopian novel: a bird's nest built entirely from fiber optic cables. These cables are used by both Ukrainian and Russian forces to avoid radio jamming on FPV drones. They are so common there are entire fields covered in them.

That aside, in this week's expert opinion takes us to Moldova. After last year’s presidential elections and EU referendum, the country is now heading toward parliamentary elections in September. We asked Irina Percemli to break down what’s at stake.

Also, we will be in Prague for GLOBSEC this week. If you are also attending, come say hi!

Enjoy reading this week’s “brief”!

— Giorgi Beroshvili, Editor

Last year saw a surge of attention to Moldova because of the presidential elections and the EU referendum. If you thought these were a dramatic standoff deciding the destiny of this country of 2.6 million, wait until you see the parliamentary elections scheduled for September 28. Wedged between Ukraine and Romania, Moldova yet again finds itself at a crossroads that could determine its future trajectory between European integration and Russian influence.

The pro-European camp is led by President Maia Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), which currently controls parliament and has strong EU backing. Brussels has been remarkably supportive, providing everything from financial assistance to military aid. The European Commission has even floated the possibility of Moldova joining the EU by 2029 — a timeline that seemed impossible just a few years ago. However, this optimistic scenario depends entirely on maintaining pro-European leadership in Chisinau.

On the other side sits a fragmented but well-funded opposition. The Socialist Party leads the pack with 13% support, but it is the shadowy network of fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor that really matters. Operating from abroad, Shor's organisation spent nearly half a million euros on Facebook ads alone between 2022 and 2024. During last year's presidential election, Russian interference efforts reportedly cost €200 million — that is 1% of Moldova's entire economy. This is not just about money. Russia is trying to prove that small nations have no choice but to submit to great power politics. For Russia, losing Moldova would signal that its post-Soviet sphere of influence is crumbling irreversibly.

Current polling suggests a nail-biting contest, with the ruling PAS party projected to win 46 seats against 55 for combined opposition forces. Critically, 20% of voters remain undecided, and diaspora voting, which proved decisive for Sandu in 2024, could again tip the balance toward pro-European forces.

Three key developments will shape the election outcome.

First, expect disinformation campaigns to ramp up dramatically. The sophisticated “Matryoshka” network, known for creating fake news that mimics legitimate media outlets, has already started flooding social media with deepfakes and coordinated manipulation.

Second, the Shor’s vote-buying operations will almost certainly expand. Despite the government’s efforts to curb it, the infrastructure that corrupted over 130,000 voters in 2024 has not disappeared. If anything, it has probably grown more sophisticated.

Third, watch whether the fractured opposition can unite. The Socialist Party holds the key. Smaller pro-Russian parties need them to form a coalition government, but the Socialists have little incentive to join since they are already likely to enter parliament alone. This creates a paradox where opposition unity is both necessary and unlikely. Some experts believe the real goal is not actual consolidation but creating enough political noise to influence the 20% of undecided voters, who tend to vote based on emotion rather than policy.

Also, there is a major wild card sitting right on the Ukrainian border — Transnistria. Recent drone operations in Russia have sparked worries about the war spilling over, with Moldova's PM claiming Russia wants to deploy 10,000 troops there. Despite militarised rhetoric and an ongoing energy crisis since Russia cut gas supplies in January, the region has avoided escalation so far.

Military action would likely backfire for everyone involved. It could radicalise Transnistrian residents, give Russia a pretext for direct intervention, and create a humanitarian crisis that Moldova cannot handle. For Ukraine, attacking offers minimal strategic benefit while risking a second front and potential Romanian complications, especially since the isolated Russian forces there pose no real threat to Ukraine's war effort anyway.

What is more likely, Russia will continue to leverage Transnistria as both a destabilising force and a potential electoral asset. Transnistria’s 350,000 predominantly Russian-speaking, pro-Moscow residents could fundamentally alter Moldova's political balance if integrated into the electoral process.

Moldova is small enough to be manageable, poor enough to be vulnerable to economic pressure, and strategically located at the intersection of EU and Russian interests. These parliamentary elections are crucial because they represent the EU's best shot at demonstrating that European integration can work even in Russia's backyard. Unlike with Ukraine, Hungary is not blocking Moldova's EU integration process. The country is small enough that EU membership would not strain Brussels' resources the way larger candidates might. If pro-Russian forces win control of parliament, Moldova's European trajectory could stall indefinitely. We have seen this playbook before in Georgia, where pro-Russian political shifts effectively froze EU integration efforts. For Moscow, successfully flipping Moldova would prove that sustained information warfare and electoral manipulation can overcome European integration — something that can be applied anywhere else.

— Irina Percemli, Editor at European Studies Review