DEAR READER,

Yesterday, Ukraine conducted one of its largest drone attacks on Russia since the war began, inflicting more than $7 billion in damages. Today, Ukrainian and Russian representatives are meeting in Istanbul to discuss a possible ceasefire, while President Zelenskyy has travelled to Vilnius to meet with NATO allies. You can read more about these developments in our top stories.

In this week's expert opinion, we are looking at the increasing number of arson attacks across Central and Eastern Europe, exploring where this trend could lead and what countries can do to address it.

Also, New Eastern Europe is looking for people from Ukraine who have found refuge from the war in European countries, including the Balkans, and who are willing to share their experience and help with research about integration. We would also like to hear from those who went abroad but decided to return home. You can share your experience here.

Enjoy reading this week’s “brief”!

— Giorgi Beroshvili, Editor

Eastern European countries are experiencing an alarming escalation in Russian hybrid warfare operations, with attacks nearly tripling between 2023 and 2024. Recent arson incidents in Poland and Lithuania are part of a coordinated campaign. Western countries often misunderstand these activities, since they do not quite reach the level of traditional warfare. It is now evident that there is an emerging pattern of Russian sabotage operations across the region that requires effective public and institutional responses.

In the last year, there have been a series of fires in Central and Eastern European countries. On May 9, 2024, an IKEA store in Vilnius was destroyed in what investigators classified as a terrorist act, causing $500,000 in damage. A few days later, in Warsaw residents discovered that a shopping centre on Marywilska Street, housing 1,400 shops, many operated by Vietnamese vendors, had burned to the ground. While initial public speculation focused on corrupt city officials seeking to clear valuable real estate, investigators later uncovered connections to Russian operations.

Ultimately, authorities arrested two Ukrainian individuals — one in Lithuania and another in Poland — both acting on behalf of Russia. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk directly blamed Russia for orchestrating these attacks, stating: "We now know for certain that the massive fire on Marywilska was the result of arson commissioned by Russian services," adding that "the rest of the perpetrators have been identified and are being sought." In immediate retaliation, Poland closed the Russian consulate in Kraków.

The Marywilska incident was preceded by a fire at an OBI store in Warsaw one month earlier. A Belarusian national arrested for the OBI fire was linked to additional arsons across Central and Eastern Europe as well.

What can be done besides diplomatic retaliation?

According to CSIS, Russian attacks in Europe nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024, compared to only three recorded attacks in 2022. These operations range from targeting Baltic Sea infrastructure and railway cyberattacks in Poland to electronic warfare against civilian aircraft and even assassinations. The Russian shadow fleet operating in the Baltic Sea is an additional layer of this challenge.

Cyberattacks remain another big challenge. In Poland, Donald Tusk announced that the ruling party's websites were under cyberattack just before presidential elections in May. Krzysztof Gawkowski, the Minister of Digital Affairs, warned that Russia was attempting to interfere in the upcoming elections through these actions.

Unlike their Western counterparts, Russian military theorists understand hybrid warfare as a modern continuation of conventional warfare—a comprehensive strategic effort where all actions serve the broader goal of reshaping target states.

This conceptual gap creates two critical vulnerabilities. First, many attacks, particularly cyber operations, remain undisclosed for operational security reasons. Without visible consequences, these operations generate little public awareness despite their devastating impact. Second, citizens tend to perceive physical sabotage as isolated incidents rather than coordinated hybrid warfare. The Warsaw shopping mall fire exemplifies this problem. Residents blamed local corruption rather than recognising a geopolitical attack.

This fragmented perception makes the public vulnerable to fear and disinformation, ultimately resulting in strategic paralysis. Thus, the fundamental question becomes: where do we draw the line between hybrid war and actual acts of war?

Some European nations have begun addressing these challenges. France is distributing household survival manuals, Nordic countries provide citizens with detailed emergency supply guidance, and Poland has announced mandatory military training for adult males. However, these measures may not be sufficient to build the institutional trust necessary to deter (or react to) hybrid attacks.

This is particularly concerning, since Polish prosecutors report growing evidence of several organised groups conducting such activities. With Russia escalating attacks in Ukraine despite peace talks, Eastern European countries could see an uptick in sabotage and hybrid attacks. Although Belarus and Russia have moved their Zapad-2025 exercises to September, this development should raise alarms among Eastern European governments and societies that must remain resilient.

As sabotage operations from Russia could prove to be the biggest risk faced by Eastern European countries, Eastern European countries have to ensure that there is public resilience to counter it.

— Giorgi Beroshvili, Editor