DEAR READER,

Before we jump into this week’s edition, two announcements:

We have just published the latest issue of New Eastern Europe! Much has been said about how Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has reshaped politics in Europe and beyond. Yet, for the societies of the Baltic Sea region, these shifts are more than security narratives and political statements. Read more by clicking this link!

Also, our friends at Lossi 36 are looking for an Editor-in-Chief. If you (or someone you know) love crafting stories, have a strong editorial eye, and are interested in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, this is your chance! Find out more here.

As for the expert opinion, we are looking at Ukrainian migration to Poland. In the early stages of the full-scale war, Poles opened their homes and institutions to millions of Ukrainians, mainly women and children, fleeing Russian aggression. Yet, by 2025, public support for this group has fallen from over 90 per cent to just 50 per cent. Iwona Reichardt will be explaining this shift and its broader implications.

Enjoy reading this week’s “brief”!

— Giorgi Beroshvili, Editor

The massive influx of Ukrainian refugees to Poland after February 24th 2022, marked a turning point not only in Polish-Ukrainian state relations, but also in public attitudes and political discourse. What began as an extraordinary wave of solidarity in Poland has gradually shifted toward ambivalence, scepticism, and even political backlash.

Importantly, Ukrainian migration to Poland did not begin in 2022. A major wave had already taken place after 2015, when Ukraine’s economic crisis pushed many working-age Ukrainians to seek work abroad. Poland, a neighbouring country with a growing economy, became one of their main destinations. Research shows that the initial experience of working side by side in Polish industries and services proved to be mutually beneficial and contributed to improved perceptions between the two societies.

This positive precedent partially explains the generous reaction of the Polish state and society in 2022. Despite having little experience with managing large-scale refugee flows, Polish authorities moved quickly to suspend Schengen restrictions and offer temporary protection to Ukrainian nationals. Civil society and local communities mobilised en masse. The media reporting on the refugees adopted an empathetic tone, focusing on the most vulnerable. As a result, public support surged, reaching a peak of 90 per cent in opinion polls.

In March 2022 the Polish parliament passed a special law which allowed Ukrainian war refugees to bypass the asylum system and immediately access residency, public education, healthcare, and social services. The decision, though extraordinary, aligned with the prevailing sentiment of compassion and moral duty. Yet even at this early stage, a significant assumption underpinned Polish solidarity: that the presence of Ukrainians would be temporary.

As the war dragged on and the economic reality in Poland began to worsen, also due to rising energy prices and inflation, the first signs of fatigue appeared. As early as September 2022 opinion polls began registering slight decreases in support. In addition, sociological studies revealed that younger Poles, and especially younger women, became more critical of the presence of Ukrainians. This may be due to overlapping needs in areas like education, healthcare, and the labour market, meaning the domains in which both groups are heavily represented.

At the same time, anti-Ukrainian rhetoric began to spread online, fuelled in part by coordinated disinformation campaigns linked to Russian sources. This rhetoric particularly gained the attention of the groups that had already been inclined towards conspiracy theories or strongly nationalistic views. In addition, anti-Ukrainian narratives started to increasingly find space in political discourse. This was especially during the 2023 farmers’ protests, which erupted over grain imports from Ukraine following EU market liberalisation. The protests, while framed as economic, became a breeding ground for broader anti-Ukrainian sentiments.

This politicisation of migration continued into the 2025 presidential campaign. Right-wing candidates openly used slogans such as “Stop the Ukrainisation of Poland.” Karol Nawrocki, the eventual winner, questioned Ukraine’s NATO membership, rejected the idea of Polish troops being sent to Ukraine post-war, and called for a more assertive stance towards Kyiv. Even centrist candidate Rafał Trzaskowski adopted a more anti-immigrant tone, stating his opposition to child benefits for non-working Ukrainian refugees.

The convergence of these positions among mainstream political actors indicates that Polish political elites are responding to a significant shift in public opinion. It is no longer politically safe to openly advocate for expansive policies supporting Ukrainians, even if such policies had broad support just a few years ago. The image of Ukrainians as temporary guests has gradually eroded, replaced by the realisation that many will stay for the foreseeable future. This realisation has led to growing tensions and reduced empathy.

Complicating the situation further is the unresolved historical dispute over the 1943 Volhynia massacre. Although set aside temporarily in 2022, the issue resurfaced in 2024 with a parliamentary resolution marking the 81st anniversary of the events. While Ukraine agreed to lift a ban on Polish exhumation works, this gesture did not reverse the downward trend in public sentiment. On the contrary, the past became another tool to stir emotion during an already polarised election campaign. As experience shows, invoking historical grievances can mobilise resentment, but resolving them rarely leads to renewed sympathy or improved relations.

The decline in support for Ukrainians in Poland is thus not the result of a single event or policy failure, but rather a combination of factors: economic hardship caused by inflation, political opportunism, disinformation, and long-standing historical tensions. It also reflects the limits of spontaneous solidarity. When initial emotions fade and practical challenges emerge, the societal mood can shift rapidly, especially in a politically polarised environment.

Nonetheless, the recognition of Ukraine as a sovereign state and strategic partner remains largely undisputed in Poland. The current challenges do not imply a breakdown in bilateral relations. Rather, they highlight the need for more sustainable, institutional responses to migration and deeper efforts to build long-term societal resilience. Understanding and addressing these underlying shifts is essential not only for managing current relations but also for shaping future cooperation in a post-war context.

— Iwona Reichardt, Deputy Editor-in-Chief at New Eastern Europe